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Two Cheers for the New Paradigm

MICHAEL M.
O’HEAR
Professor,
Marquette
University Law
School

Following decades in which the U.S. Department of Justice
has consistently advocated for a rigid and harsh legalism in
criminal justice policy—in which the DOJ, in the name of
abstract principles of national uniformity, has willfully
disregarded the devastating impact of its charging, pleabargaining, and sentencing practices on real-life human
beings—Attorney General Holder’s address to the American Bar Association seems a breath of fresh air.1 He calls
for a more flexible federal criminal justice system, in which
prosecutorial charging priorities are more specifically tailored to meet local needs, in which sentencing is more
individualized to the offender and prosecutors sometimes
forego mandatory minimum sentences, and in which
individual U.S. Attorney Offices experiment with new
diversion programs as an alternative to conventional case
processing. Holder believes—correctly, I think—that
a more flexible and pragmatic system can achieve better
public safety results at a lesser cost than a system in which
preserving the integrity of the federal sentencing guidelines
is the overriding value.
Through Holder’s address, DOJ offers its most prominent and unequivocal endorsement yet of an emerging new
criminal justice paradigm. The new paradigm, which
seems increasingly well-established within many state
criminal justice systems, is rooted in our nation’s two
decades of experience with drug treatment courts (DTCs).
DTCs first appeared in the early 1990s and spread rapidly,
reflecting a widespread feeling among practitioners that
legalistic approaches to the War on Drugs—such as the use
of mandatory minimums—were far more effective at filling
prison cells than at depressing the drug trade. In Holder’s
address, I hear echoes of many characteristic features of
DTC rhetoric and practice: an atheoretical pragmatism and
openness to grassroots experimentation; an overriding
concern with recidivism risk and its reduction; a recognition that the routine functioning of the criminal justice
system may end up enhancing, rather than diminishing,
the risks posed by many offenders; sharp distinctions
between nonviolent and violent offenders, with alternatives
to incarceration and rehabilitative programming particularly targeting the former; and an appreciation that prison
and jail cells are a scarce resource that should be reserved
for the most dangerous offenders. These ideas and values
have already informed a large and diverse second wave of
state and local criminal justice reforms following on the
heels of the DTCs, including all manner of other specialized ‘‘problem-solving’’ courts, prosecutorial diversion

programs, prisoner reentry initiatives, and new opportunities for prisoners to secure early release from confinement.
The ‘‘let a hundred flowers bloom’’ mentality evident in
state and local systems across the country has stood in
marked contrast to the federal system’s obsessive concern
with national uniformity in punishment.
If Holder’s ABA speech truly points to the future, then
the federal system will come to look increasingly like what
one sees at other levels of government. Because such
a transformation holds real promise for a system that better
protects public safety at far less cost, I hesitate to voice any
reservations about the Attorney General’s remarks. Yet,
I think it important to highlight two significant gaps in
Holder’s vision—gaps that also seem more generally evident in the emerging new paradigm.
The first gap relates to individual liberty. It is not hard to
discern a set of core values that undergird Holder’s address.
Certain buzzwords are repeated again and again: ‘‘safety,’’
‘‘efficiency,’’ ‘‘tough,’’ ‘‘smart,’’ and ‘‘justice.’’ But ‘‘liberty,’’
‘‘freedom,’’ and ‘‘individual rights’’ seem conspicuously
absent.
I find the gap worrisome. The new paradigm’s basic
thrust seems to be toward risk management and cost–
benefit balancing. It is as if we were regulating crime in the
same way that we regulate toxic pollutants. Our environmental protection agencies carefully measure risk and
prescribe different regulations for different substances.
Some are deemed so dangerous that they are simply
banned. Others must be handled in certain prescribed ways
based on established best practices for cost-effective risk
reduction. Similarly, the new criminal justice paradigm
emphasizes prison (the analog of a straight ban) for the
most dangerous offenders and evidence-based riskreduction strategies for everyone else.
The difference, of course, is that criminals, unlike toxic
pollutants, are human beings whose autonomy has an
intrinsic moral value.
The problem with cost–benefit analysis, in any realm, is
that it tends to downplay or ignore the ‘‘soft’’ variables—the
values that are not readily quantified. And individual
autonomy is about as soft a variable as you will find.
As we move from a legalistic orientation in criminal
justice to a cost–benefit orientation, it is very important for
policymakers and practitioners to attend constantly to the
basic value of liberty. Holder’s speech, however, provides
little indication that the Attorney General is doing so. (The
Obama Administration’s national security policies also
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seemingly point to a disregard of liberty in favor of
aggressive risk-reduction.)
At a broad, conceptual level, greater attention to liberty
would have at least two important implications for the new
criminal justice paradigm. First, a genuine concern for
liberty should cause us to be very slow to conclude that any
class of offenders is too dangerous for rehabilitative alternatives to simple incapacitation. Excessive caution in this
line-drawing exercise has, for instance, been a significant
issue with DTCs, many of which have categorically
excluded individuals with any history of violence, even
though the violence may have been aberrational or linked to
a treatable substance abuse problem.
Second, a genuine concern for liberty should cause us to
be very selective about what problems are handled in any
fashion by the criminal justice system. The system’s most
basic tools are those of coercion, and as the old saying goes,
‘‘If the only tool you have is a hammer, then every problem
looks like a nail.’’ No matter how well-intentioned, rehabilitative programming overseen by the criminal justice
system is apt to exhibit powerfully coercive tendencies.
DTCs again provide a case in point. Although framed as an
alternative to incarceration, DTCs employ incarceration,
sometimes quite liberally, as a stick to ensure compliance
with the treatment regimen. It is not unknown for DTC
participants to spend more time in jail than they would have
if they had gone through conventional case processing.
A due regard for liberty might cause us to question whether
substance abuse really is the sort of social problem that
should be handled through any criminal justice agency,
whether or not the agency has a rehabilitative mission.
The second gap in Holder’s speech relates to the overuse
of very long sentences for serious crimes. His agenda
focuses on ‘‘nonviolent’’ offenders who commit ‘‘low-level’’
crimes. It is not hard to feel some sympathy for these
offenders, especially when they have been subjected to
some draconian mandatory minimum. However, the

federal reform agenda should also focus on offenders who
have committed serious crimes that undeniably warrant
significant periods of incarceration. ‘‘Significant’’ does not
have to mean, and should not normally mean, ‘‘most or all
of the remainder of the offender’s life.’’ In much of the
world, decade-plus sentences are considered quite harsh,
but these have become a routine occurrence in our federal
system, and even sentences of life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) are not uncommon.
Such super-sized sentences raise many concerns. For
one thing, a system that increasingly tries to reserve
expensive prison beds for the most dangerous offenders
should be very hesitant to impose multidecade sentences
when we know that most offenders eventually age out of
their criminality. For another, long sentences on the high
end of the offense severity scale normalize harshness in the
system and may tend to exert a gravitational pull on sentences in lower-level cases, too. But, perhaps most importantly, there is the seeming cruelty of a sentence that leaves
the offender little realistic possibility of release before death
or decrepitude. As the Supreme Court has observed, LWOP
raises many of the same concerns as the death penalty; it
‘‘gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no
chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.’’2 These
same considerations that led the Court to declare juvenile
LWOP unconstitutionally cruel should also inform how
policymakers and practitioners—from the Attorney General down—view the range of sentences that are formally
less severe, but practically little different, from LWOP.
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Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the Annual
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html.
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